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WEST FIBGINIA LAW QUARTEBLY
ANOMALOUS FEATURES OF DEMURRERS TO THE
EVIDENCE IN WEST VIRGINIA
By LEO CARLIN*
Demurrers to the evidence in England, appearing shortly after
the advent of the jury system, are now obsolete.' They are used
only in a minority of the American states, and in these not very
frequently.2 As recently as the year 1909, in making a comparison
between demurrers to the evidence and motions to direct a ver-
dict, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Soward v.
American Car Company,3 referring to the practice in West Vir-
ginia, speaks of "the largely disused demurrer to the evidence".
Expressions of a like import may be found in the earlier decisions
and perhaps in the more recent ones. In the year 1902, in White
v. Hoster Brewing Company4 the West Virginia Supreme Court,
apparently for the first time, recognized in its full application the
doctrine of directing verdicts upon a preponderance of the evi-
dence, thus according to this important trial expedient the maxi-
mum efficiency which it enjoyed elsewhere. Considering the re-
sults in other jurisdictions, one might have expected the expan-
sion in West Virginia of what is recognized as the modern sub-
stitute for demurrers to the evidence to have coincided with a de-
cadence in the practice of demurring to the evidence. Seemingly
the contrary has occurred. There are indications that the de-
murrer to the evidence has absorbed new vitality from the ex-
pansion of its rival. One who has read the West Virginia deci.
sions handed down within the last few years can not escape the
impression that the practice of demurring to the evidence in this
state, instead of being obsolescent, is becoming even more popular.
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 234-235.
2 15 HARv. L. REV. 738. Doubtless, in many of the states, what is called a de-
murrer to the evidence is largely so in name only. THAYER, EVIDENCE, 238. "This
method of procedure, it is said, has been expressly recognized and allowed in nine-
teen of the States. In the other States, the ourts direct non-su!ts ororder ver-
,dicts, and thereby, in effect, accomplish the same results." BuRRS, PLEADING &
IRACTICE, §256.
66 W. Va. 266, 66 S. E. 329 (1909).
4 51 W. Va. 2!9, 41 S. E. 130 (1902).
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The practitioner in Virginia or West Virginia who has had
,occasion to investigate, even casually, the law of demurrers to the
evidence in either state can not have failed to notice that the de-
cisions of these two states rest upon doctrines peculiarly their
own.5 Congenital deformities are accepted more or less as a mat-
'ter of course. Hence, doubtless, many who are aware of such
peculiarities have not paused to consider nor taken time to in-
"vestigate how radical they are, and to what extent they are a de-
parture from true legal principle. An attempt will be made
in this article to point out some of the anomalous features of prac-
tice, principally as illustrated in the West Virginia decisions. In
-order to do this intelligently, it will be necessary briefly to re-
view a few of the fundamental principles relating to demurrers
'to the evidence.
In its logical and consistent application, a demurrer to the evi-
-dence is more essentially a pleading process than a trial process.
It primarily involves the law of the case.6 It has a very close
.analogy to a demurrer to a pleading.7 The facts of the case, or
the items of evidence from which these facts may be deduced,
-through the necessity of principles hereinafter discussed, are ad-
mitted. Nothing is in dispute. The court simply declares the
legal effect of admitted facts or evidence. It is true, as will be
noted later, that in some jurisdictions only the truth of the evi-
dence is admitted by the demurrer and the court has the task
of deducing the facts from the evidence, a function ordinarily
'devolving upon the jury; but even here, the basis upon which
the facts rest is admitted. In those jurisdictions where the de-
murrant is compelled to admit the facts on the record, the court,
in passing upon a demurrer to the evidence, exercises precisely
the same functions as in ruling upon a demurrer to a pleading.
The only difference is that in a demurrer to the evidence the facts
-considered are one step farther removed from the law of the case
which they are intended to support. A demurrer to a pleading
tests the sufficiency of pleading facts to meet the requirements
-of the law in view of which the pleading is filed. A demurrer to
-the evidence, in its true application, tests the sufficiency of evi-
5 Bowman v. Dewing & Sons. 50 W. Va. 445, 40 S. E. 576 (1901).
a "Such demurrers, like others, raised only an issue of law." THAYER, EVI-DENCeC, 234.E See 4 MINOR, INSTITUTES, 748; BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE, §256; 38 Cyc.
1541, and cases cited. Under the original practice in England. which, it will be
noted later, always has been the practice in Virginia and west Virginia. a demurrer
to the evidence differPd from a demurrer to the pleeding in the fact that the court
,inferred facts from the evidence. THAYER, EVDENCE, 234.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1921], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss3/5
WBST YIRGINI.A LAW QUARTErLY
dentiary facts to sustain pleading facts. Hence, indirectly, a de-
murrer to the evidence inquires into the sufficiency of evidentiary
facts to sustain, the law supporting the pleading. A demurrer to
"he evidence, in its purest concept, may be looked upon merely as
a demurrer to an expanded pleading. In any event, the court
merely determines the legal effect of undisputed facts. Pleading
facts and evidentiary facts, in their ultimate object, have a pre-
cisely similar function: to establish in law the existence or non-
existence of a right to recover. The only distinction between them
in this respect is that pleading facts are few and large, while evi-
dentiary facts are ordinarily numerous and small. In either case,
a determination of the legal sufficiency or insufficiency is a judi-
cial function and not a function of the jury. The function of the
jury is to determine the existence or nonexistence of facts, par-
ticularly in a conflict of opposing testimony, and not to interpret
the application of such facts nor to determine their legal effect.
What has been said applies literally in those jurisdictions Where
the demurrant admits the facts on the record and largely ixi those
jurisdictions where the court deduces the facts from the evi-
dence. The court, in passing upon the collective sufficiency or
insufficiency of admitted evidentiary facts, no more usurps the
province of the jury than in ruling upon a demurrer to a plead-
ing. When the court deduces facts, although from admitted tes-
timony, it must be conceded that the court exercises a function
regularly performed by the jury;8 but this function is far re-
moved from that of passing upon the truth and veracity of wit-
nesses and the preponderance of conflicting testimony in general.
The latter is the primary and important function of the jury,
as illustrated.in the law pertaining to motions to direct verdicts
and motions for new trials. The former, perhaps, is largely a
fortuitous and incidental function. It might very well be doubted
whether we would have hadany jury if we had had nothing for
it to do but deduce facts from testimony the truth of which was
admitted.9
It is believed that the law of demurrers to the evidence, worked
out more or less upon the principles stated above, has been con-
ceived and moulded on two primary considerations, each distinct
8 THAYER, EVIDENCE, 234-239.
9 Sustaining the general principles stated, see Higgs v. Shebee, 4 Fla. 382 (1852)
Miller v. Franklin Insurance Co., 8 W. Va. 515 (1875); Allen v. Bartlett, 20 W.
Va. 46 (1882) ; THAYER, EVIDENCE, 235 et. seq.; 39 Cyc. 1542-1544, and cases cited;
7 STANDARD PROC. 9. Also, see cases .cited in note 15, infra.
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in its concept, yet both reaching back to the same fundamental
basis: (1) that a demurrer to the evidence is very little different
from a demurrer to a pleading; (2) that the court, in passing
upon a demurrer to the evidence, cannot consider a conflict in
the evidence, cannot determine a preponderance, because to do
so would be to invade the province of the jury. Apparently, the
vacillating decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court have
resulted from an attempt to follow these principles and at the same
time unnaturally to expand the functions of the remedy. The
full meaning of this statement will be developed later.
From this fundamental concept of a demurrer to the evidence
emerge various rules defining and limiting the scope of the rem-
edy and the method of its application. For purposes of this dis-
cussion, it will be necessary to bear in mind principally the ration-
ale of the rules fixing the following things: (1) the status of the
parties who may demur; (2) the nature of the evidence which
may be the subject of a demurrer; and (3) the proper method of
applying the demurrer to the evidence. These propositions will
be considered briefly in the order stated.
Most frequently, it is said that only the party having the nega-
tive of the issue may demur to the evidence. Reversely stated, a
demurrer can be interposed only to the evidence of the party hav-
ing the affirmative of the issue. Another statement of the rule is
that a demurrer can be interposed only to the evidence introduced
by the party having the burden of proof.10 Perhaps in most of
these instances the terms "affirmative of the issue" and "burden
of proof" are used synonymously. Normally, the burden of proof
follows the affirmative of the issue.
Such a rule is consonant with pure legal theory and is justified
by expediency. Evidence supporting the affirmative of an issue
reaches back through some pleading, at least imaginary if not
actual, to the law of the case. Hence, a demurrer truly tests the
legal sufficiency of such evidence to support the law of the case.
But evidence supporting the negative, of an issue merely denies
other evidence. Strictly speaking, it neither supports nor contro-
verts any pleading. It is pertinent and relevant only in connec-
tion with the evidence supporting the affirmative of the issue.
Its sufficiency could be tested only in terms of denial, with sich
denial directed toward the opposing testimony, and not toward a
lo Bennett v. Perkins, 47 W. Va. 425, 35 S. E. 8 (1899). See 38 Cyc. 1541,
and cases cited.
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pleading. Hence a demurrer to such evidence would involve nec-
essarily a consideration of conflicting testimony, and thus would
invade radically the province of the jury. The propriety of the
rule would seem to be apparent, but it must be conceded that
there are difficulties in its application.
Normally, the affirmative of the issue and the burden of proof
rest with the plaintiff upon any traverse to a declaration. It
ordinarily rests with the defendant when he relies upon an
affirmative plea. Of course, it may be shifted back and forth by,
subsequent affirmative replications, rejoinders, etc. Moreover,
it must always be understood that either party may affirm a
negative and thus have the burden of proof upon negative allega-
tions, although practically he has the affirmative of the issue as
understood in this discussion. Again, it is conceivable that a
party may on the face of ,the pleadings have the negative of the
issue and yet with reference to his evidence practically have the
affirmative of an issue. In many instances, notably in case and
assumpsit, the general issue is very broad and includes numerous
defences that are essentially affirmative in nature and normally
and rationally should be asserted under a special plea. In such
instances, although the general issue ostensibly places the affirm-
ative of the issue with the plaintiff, no substantial principle would
be violated, even according to the most orthodox rule, in permit-
ting him to demur to that part of the defendant's evidence which
supports the affirmative defence. Under the circumstances, it is
consistent to assume an imaginary affirmative plea which the de
fendant's evidence supports, and thus to say that he has the af-
firmative of an issue."
The logic of this argument may be carried entirely beyond those
instances in which plainly affirmative defences are obscured in
the general issue. There is no reason based on principle or ex-
11 By way of illustration, suppose that A sues B in case for personal injuries,
alleging negligence. A makes a prima facie case by proving that B was negligent.
Thereupon, B, in no way controverting anything A has proved, undertakes to
prove that A was guilty of contributory negligence. In Alabama it is necessary to
assert such a defense under a special plea. Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Crocker,
95 Ala. 412, 11 So. 262 (1891). Of course the evidence supporting this plea.
under proper circumstances, would be subject to a demurrer. In West Virginia,
the defence of contributory negligence may be asserted under the general issue,
but the burden of proving it rests on the defendant. See Woodell -V. West Virginia
Improvement Co., 38 W. Va. 23, 47-48, 17 S. E. 386, 395 (1893). See also
cases cited in 10 ENcYc. DIG. VA. & W. VA. REP. 406; Southern R. Co. v. Rice,
115 Va. 235, 78 S. E. 592 (1913). Notwithstanding the fact that there is no
special plea in West Virginia covering the defence, the defendant, to all intents
and purposes, has the burden of proof and is in the same position as if he had the
affirmative of an issue resting upon a special plea, and a demurrer to his evidence,
under prhper circumstances, should be entertained. Cf. Wood v,. Phillips, 117 Va.
874, 86 S. R. 101 (1915). Many additional illustrations may easily be imagined.
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pediency why any evidence introduced by either party by way of
admission and avoidance may not be demurred to, always pro
vided that such evidence exclusively avoids and does not deny.
Such a practice may practically involve a true shifting of the-
burden of proof.12 As opposed to such a conclusion, it is said,
that the party having the affirmative of the issue (meaning, of
course, the original affirmative imposed by the pleadings) can
not be allowed to assume that he has made out his own case.?3
Why not? No such objection can be raised when a plaintiff de-
murs to a plea. The fact that the declaration is, or may be, bad
does not prevent a demurrer to a plea. The only effect is, if the.
plaintiff demurs, to visit the plaintiff's demurrer upon his own:
defective declaration. Why not use a similar process in demurrers:
to the evidence? Of course, all that has been said assumes that
a trial process of admission and avoidance in the evidence has
virtually abandoned the original affirmative fixed by the pleadings
and practically substituted a new affirmative resting upon the
evidence. It should be carefully noted that such a practice would
be a thing entirely different from considering the evidence of
both sides upon a demurrer, and not open to objection upon that
ground. The question here involved is not what evidence may be-
considered upon the demurrer, but upon whose evidence the de-
mirrer may be visited.
The true rule, based upon principle and the great weight of
authority, is that, upon a demurrer to the evidence, only the evi-
dence of the demurree can be considered.' It has already been
12 The practice is perfectly demonstrated in Hall v. Webb, 21 W. Va. 318 (1883)
ana Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 49 S. E. 409 (1904). Each of these cases,
was an action in ejectment, in which the plaintiff proved a paper title and the-
defendant, not controverting the paper title, undertook to show title by adverse,
possession. The plaintiff demurred to the defendant's evidence and the defendant
joined In the demurrer without objection. No question was raised as to the pro-
priety of the demurrer, but likely, if necessary, the court would have compelled
a joinder therein. Possibly Judge Brannon, in Hollandsworth V. Stone, note 54,
infra, may have had in mind an indefinite idea as to the shifting of the burden
of proof by admission and avoidance in the evidence, but the facts of the latter,
case can not be adjusted to this principle.
Those instances wherein the burden of proof as to certain facts is imnosed upon
the party in a position to have peculiar knowledge of those facts, regardless oi
whether he have the affirmative or the negative of the issue, are exceptional. They-
are based upon expediency and necessity, and not unon principle. Yet, since the
burden is just as emphatic and its scope Just as clearly defined as if it rested upon,
the affirmative of an issue, there is no practical reason why the evidence support-.
Ing it may not be subjected to a demurrer.
13 Bennett v. Perkins, supra.
3 See 38 Cyc. 1542, and cases cited. The language in 7 STANDARD PRoc. 6-7,.
clearly intimates that the evidence of the demurrant not conflictinz with that of the
demurree may be considered. The Virginia and West Virginia case cited, by virtue.
of the peculiar doctrines prevailing in these states, sustain the pronosItion. So do
the Federal cases cited, because they were decided in West Virginia, and hence,
conformed to the West Virginia practice. It is believed that the only other case.
cited tending to sustain the proposition is Fink V. Kansas City Southern R. Co.,
6
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sufficiently explained why this is so where the evidence of the de-
murrant conflicts with that of the demurree. 15 On principle, it is
equally objectionable to consider evidence of the demurrant which
does not conflict. To do so would be to consider a speaking de-
nurrer to the evidence. Speaking demurrers to pleadings have
been universally and unhesitatingly condemned, as repugnant to
the fundamental concept of demurrers. 16 The same reasoning
should apply to demurrers to the evidence. In most jurisdictions,
in harmony with this principle, a party is not allowed to demur
to his opponent's evidence after he has introduced his own evi-
dence.17  In other jurisdictions, he may still demur, but, as we
have just seen, his own evidence can not be considered and is un-
derstood to be withdrawn or waived. Only in Virginia and West
Virginia, it has been said, may a demurrant have any benefit from
his own evidence.18
Under the original English practice, it appears, the effect of
a demurrer to the evidence was to admit the truth merely of the
demurree's evidence and not of the facts which this evidence
tended to prove. 9 In the year 1793, a decision was handed down
from the House of Lords to the effect that a demurree would not
be compelled to join in a demurrer to the evidence until the de-
murrant had admitted on the record the facts which the evidence
of the demurree tended to prove.20 As appears from the previous
discussion, such a practice eliminates all question of invading the
province of the jury and more nearly approximates the pleading
analogy; but at the same time that it rendered the procedure more
definite, it likewise rendered it more perilous for the demurrant.
This decision, it is said, gave the death blow to demurrers to the
evidence in England.2 ' The doctrine of this case was an innova-
tion, a fact which has evoked surprise that many of the American
161 Mo. App. 314, 143 S. W. 568 (1912), and In this case the point is not di-
rectly dp';ded. Tri- wreat majority of the cages cited clearly h-Id to the contrary
view. The "conflict" in the evidence referred to In many of the cases plainly
refers to a conflict in different phases of the demurree's evidence.
In Illinois. it is held that evidence brought out by cross-examination of the de-
murree's witnesses is waived. Pratt v. Stone, 10 Ill. App. 633 (1882).
Is Fink v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., supra; Shaw v. White, 28 Ala. 637
(1856). Also see authorities cited in note 9, supra.
16 Graham's case, 1 Ct. Cl. 183 (U. S. 1865). See 31 Cyc. 322-323, and the
great multitude of cases there cited.
IT See 38 Cyc. 1545, and cases cited; 7 STANDARD PaOC. 14.
,8 Bwman 'V. Dewing & Sons, 50 W. Va. 445, 40 S. E. 576 (1901) ; Bowers v.
Bristol Gas etc. Co., 100 Va. 533, 42 S. E. 296 (1902). See 38 Cyc. 1542,
where the Virginia and West Virginia rule is referred to as "an anomalous and
inde nPeible rule of procedure."
19 THAYER, EVIDENCE, 234-239.'
20 Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. BI. 187 (1793).
21 THAYER, EVIDENcE, 234-235.
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:states should have adopted it under the impression that it was
the original English rule. Perhaps the surprise should not be so
great when it is considered that the English decision was handed
•dowh when American law was in its early formative period, and
'when it must have been realized that the new rule tended more
securely to limit the demurrer to the evidence to its proper plead-
ing function and thus to eliminate any question that otherwise
night have existed as to its invading the province of the jury.22 Of
eourse, in those jurisdictions where the demurrant admits no ab-
solute facts, but only the truth of his opponent's evidence, only
the evidence is inserted in the demurrer, and the court must de-
duce the facts from the evidence. 3  In -jurisdictions where the
facts are admitted on the record, it seems that both the facts and
the evidence of the demurree are inserted in the demurrer2 4
It is believed that the state of the local law may best be con-
sidered by reversing the order used in the general discussion and
eonsidering first the evidence to which the demurrer is applied.
In Virginia and West Virginia, it has always been the custom
to insert the evidence in the demurrer, and not the facts which the
evidence tends to prove.2 5  Likewise, by the decisions of both
states, the rule was early established that the evidence of both the
demurree and the demurrant must be incorporated in the de-
murrer,26 a practice which seemingly has prevailed in no jurisdic-
tion outside of these two states.27  Obviously, it would be a worse
than useless process to insert evidence of the demurrant in the
demurrer unless such evidence should receive some consideration
upon a hearing of the demurrer. The practice of incorporating
such evidence in the demurrer is such a radical departure from
principle that one could easily expect from it the most startling
results. In Virginia, however, the unorthodox practice has been con.
= Ibid. It is interesting to note that, although the early Virginia and West
Virginia cases refer to Gibson v. Hunter as expounding the orthodox, and ap-
parently the original. English rule, nevertheless they follow, unconsciously, the
English rule nrevalline prior to Gibson v. Hunter. Green v. Judith, 5 Rand. 1(Va. 1827) ; Miller v. Franklin Insurance Co., 8 W. Va. 515 (1875).
2 Hansbrough's Exr. v. Thorn. 3 Leigh 147 (Va. 1831).
SSo 38 Cyc. 154., and cases cited. It Is expedient to insert both the facts and
the evidence in the demurrer so that the appellate cnurt may examine the evidence
and decide as to the pronriety of the facts which the demurrant is compelled to
admit witbnut necessity of bringing the evidence into the record by a bill of excep-
'Lions. BURKS. PLADING AND PRACTICE, §257.
0 HTansbrough's Exr. v. Thom, supra; Miller v. Franklin Insurance Co., supra.
'For the reason for the local rule, see BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE, §257.
0 Perhaps the heat review of the earlv Psaes in Virginia on thiq subject will be
found in Grepn v. Judith, supra. See Muhleman a. National Insurance Co., 6 W.
'Va. 508 (3873). and eases cited in preceding note.
27 See authorities cited in note 18, supra. A good example of a demurrant's
evidence that does not conflict with that of the demurree, and hence may be con-
sidered, will be found in Bewers v. Bristol Gas, etc., Co., suyra.
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ceded only the minimum of possible effect. The demurrant is
held to waive all his contradicted evidence. Hence, of course,
only the uncontradicted evidence of the demurrant can be con-
sidered 2s  In West Virginia, a result has been reached which is
so radical and complicated that it deserves special and extended
consideration.
In the earlier West Virginia decisions, the Virginia rule was
adopted and applied.2 9  The first deviation from this rule seem-
ingly had its inception in what is believed to have been an un-
necessary construction placed upon a statutory amendment. In
the year 1891, section 9 of chapter 131 of the West Virginia Code
was amended and reenacted. Prior to this amendment, upon any
question of appellate relief involving the weight of the evidence,
except in cases of demurrers to the evidence, it had been the prac-
tice to certify to the Supreme Court the facts of the case instead
of the evidence upon which the facts were based. 0 The amend-
ment required the evidence to be certified and further directed
that the whole of the evidence so certified should be considered
by the Supreme Court. The first fruits of the amendment ap-
peared in 1894, in Johnson v. Burns,31 where the Supreme Court.
reviewed the action of a circuit court in overruling a motion to
set aside a verdict and grant a new trial. It was held that the
Supreme Court, in consideringl whether the verdict was sus-
tained by the evidence, was bound to take into consideration and
give effect to all the evidence in the case, whether introduced by,
the plaintiff or the defendant and whether conflicting or uncou-
tradicted.
It is believed that this amendment, whatever its effect upon mo-
tions for a new trial, was never intended to change the practice
regarding demurrers to the evidence. It certainly made no
change in respect to certifying the evidence, because it had always
been the custom in West Virginia to insert all the evidence, not
the facts of the case, in the demurrer.3 2 Nor did it necessarily add
anything with reference to considering all the evidence, for the
court had always, in a certain sense (the sense intended by the
statute, it is believed), considered all the evidence upon a de-
murrer to the evidence, merely refusing to give any effect to con-
- BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE, §261.
29 Allen v. Bartlett, 20 W. Va. 46 (1882), and cases cited.
0 Johnson v. Burns, 39 W. Va. 658, 668, 20 S. E. 686 (1894).
am ibid.
12 Note 26, supra; Gunn v. Ohio River R. Co., 42 W. Va. 676, 690, 26 S. E. 64%,.(1896).
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tradicted evidence of the demurrant. It is pertinent to notice
that, although all the evidence must be considered, the amendment
says nothing about what effect shall be given to any of the evi-
,dence when it is considered. The statute was likely intended
merely to introduce a new expedient in appellate procedure and
not to work any change in the fundamentals of trial practice.
Such an intention is indicated by the fact that the language of
the act is directed to the Supreme Court and not to the trial
courts. It is submitted that there is nothing in the language of
the statute which makes it incumbent upon even the Supreme
Court to give effect to the conflicting evidence of both parties upon
a demurrer to the evidence; and it would seem unusual to infer
s ch a radical innovation from anything but express language.3 3
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court felt impelled by the statute to.
apply the rule of Johnson v. Burns to demurrers to the evi-
dence.
The first utterance in this respect came in 1896, in Mapel v.
John .3 - Since this is the first definite statement of what must be
considered a: new and radical doctrine, it is worth; while to,
quote the precise language of the court:
"By demurring to the evidence the demurrant is now,
under section 9 of chapter 131, not held to waive any of his.
competent evidence; but where it conflicts with that of the
other party it will be regarded as overborne, unless it man-
ifestly appears to be clearly and decidedly preponderant. He
admits the credit of the evidence demurred to, and all infer-
ences of fact that may be fairly deducible from the evidence,
but only such facts as are fairly deducible; and refers it to,
the court to deduce such fair inferences."
Not quite a year later, in Young v. West Virginia, etc. R. Co.,
and Talbott v. West Virginia, etc. R. Co.," the same rule is re-
peated in identical language. The opinions in the latter case and
MapeZ v. John were written by Judge Holt. Hardly was the ink
dry on Judge Holt's opinion in Talbott v. West Virginia, etc. R.
Co., when Judge Brannon, in Gunn v. Ohtio River R. Co., 7 sub-
jected the rule of MapeZ v. John to a pointed criticism. The ques-
S3 The radical nature of the new rule and its dangers are clearly recognized by
Judge Dent in Akers v. De Witt, 41 W. Va. 229, 23 S. E. 669 (1895). See HOGG,
PLEADING & FORmS, 533n.
42 W. Va. 30. 24 S. E. 608 (1896).
42 W. Va. 112, 121, 24 S. E. 615 (1eS6).
42 W. Va. 560, 26 S. E. 311 (1896).
37 Note 32, supra.
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tion seems next to have come before the court four years later,
in Shaver v. Edgell, decided in 1900. The opinion in this case
is likewise by Judge Brannon and is a plain repudiation of the
doctrine of Mapel v. John. Not long afterward, in Teel v. Ohio
River R. Co., 9 Judge Dent assumes the burden of the discussion.
Basing his argument upon the previous opinions of Judge Holt
and his own analysis of the statute, he reaches conclusions di-
rectly opposed to the views of Judge Brannon previously ex-
pressed. When, finally, in Bowman v. Dewing & Sons," de-
cided in 1901, the new rule was adopted in the full purport of its
radical effect, it was not again to be questioned.41 The opinion in
the latter case was written by Judge Dent, and he openly recog-
-nizes the isolation of his doctrine. Perhaps the practical effect of
the new rule is nowhere better stated than in Barrett v. Raleigh
Goal & Coke Co.,42 the next case in Which it is fully discussed, where
the opinion is again written by Judge Dent:
"On the subject of the conflict of evidence the rule then
would be that all the evidence of the demurrant in conflict
with the evidence of the demurree should be rejected unless
the conflicting evidence of the demurrant so plainly prepon-
derates over the evidence of the demurree, that if there were
a verdict in favor of the latter it would be set aside, and in
such case the demurrer must be sustained. For if the evi-
dence, although conflicting, plainly preponderates in favor
of the demurrant, judgment should be entered accordingly."
All the later cases uniformly sustain the new rule, although
the court is not always consistent in the citation of authorities.43
To understand the attitude of the court as evidenced in Maple
v. John and the later cases in accord, it is necessary to bear in
mind the purport of decisions handed down prior to Johnson v.
Burns. A close analogy always had been recognized between the
status of the evidence upon a motion for a new trial and the
48 W. Va. 502, 37 S. E. 664 (1900).
39 49 W. Va. 85, 38 S. E. 518 (1901).
50 W. Va. 445, 40 S. E. 576 (1901).41 Stewart v. Lyons 54 W. Va. 665, 47 S. E. 442 (1903), seems to adhere to the
,ld rule, and in this respect cites Shaver v. Edgell; but at the same time the in-
wnsistent case of Bowman v. Dewing & Sons is cited and approved.
55 W. Va. 395, 398, 47 S. E. 154, 155 (1904).
9 Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 49 S. E. 409 (1904) ; Mannon v. Camden
Interstate R. Co., 56 W. Va. 554, 49 S. E. 450 (1904); Kelley v. Ohio River R.
'o., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S. E. 520, 898 (1905) ; Robinson v. Sheets, 63 W. Va. 394,
61 S. E. 347 (1908) ; McNeer v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 76 W. Va. 803, 86
S. E. 887 (1915) ; Miller v. Johnson, 79 W. Va. 198, 90 S. E. 677 (1916) ; Rob-
inson v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 80 W. Va. 567, 585, 92 S. E. 730,
L. R. A. 1917E, 995 (1917) ; Chafln v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 80 W. Va. 703,
*3 S. E. 822 (1917).
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status of the evidence upon a demurrer to the evidence. Frequent
comparisons had been made. It was frequently said that the
movant made the same concessions with reference to the evidence
upon a motion for a new trial which a demurrant is compelled to
make upon a demurrer to the evidence. The party in whose fa-
vor the verdict stood was said to occupy the same position as a
demurree, and vice versa.44 However, it is submitted that only
an analogy was recognized, and this merely as a matter of con-
venience. No rule of law said that the practice must be the same
in both instances. In application of the analogy, the rule growing
out of motions for a new trial was not looked upon as dictating
the rule applied to demurrers to the evidence. The two things
were, under the state of the law as it existed then, merely similar
by coincidence, and neither absolutely controlled the other. How-
ever, Judge Dent, instead of considering that the motion for a
new trial under the amended statute had simply lost its previous
status (if such a conclusion was necessary), seems to have looked
upon the analogy as a necessity that could not be abandoned,
4 5
while at the same time he did violence to the inevitable and fund-
amental analogy which exists between a demurrer to the evidence
and a pleading. Whether, as Judge Dent thought, expediency,
based upon considerations of uniformity in practice, justified the
new rule, is a different question. Even so, it is none the less a
departure from principle.
The effect of the rule announced in Maple v. John was to dis-
tort the entire concept of demurrers to the evidence. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that the unbalancing agitation of the
new doctrine should draw into question the status of the parties
who may demur to the evidence. We have here again a period
of vacillation, which, in this instance, has ended in uncertainty.
In the earlier West Virginia cases, it is frequently asserted that
"either party may demur to the evidence. ' '4 6 Such an assertion
is true in the sense, and to the extent, that either party, plaintiff
or defendant, may have the negative of the issue.47 In this sense,
" An attempt will not be made to collect the numerous cases in which the an-
alogy has been recognized. It will be sufficient to note the ultimate effect, which
may be seen In Teel v. Ohio River R. Co., 49 W. Va. 85, 86-89, 38 S. E. 518"
(1901), and Barrett v. Raleigh Coal & Coke Co., 55 W. Va. 395, 47 S. E. 154(1904).
'1 Ibid.
4O See cases cited in Bennett v. Perkins, supra. A search of the reports will
reveal many others.
47 In 6 ENcYc. PL. & PRAC. 440, quoted in the case last cited, it is said: "Either
party has a right to demur to the evidence, but the demurrer is only applicable to
the evidence of the party holding the affirmative of the issue."
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it is nothing more than a truism. However such statements may
have been intended, there -is reason to believe that eventually they
served to create the unnecessary impression that either party
might demur to the evidence in any case, regardless of whether he
had the affirmative or the negative of the issue.4  If such an im-
pression existed, it either amounted to a conviction or else was in
-a nebulous state; for no question growing out of it seems to have
-come before the court for decision in the earlier cases. Moreover,
since, prior to the rule laid down in Mapel v. John, the demurrant
-was compelled to waive all his evidence which conflicted with that
of the demurree, in most instances it would not have been expedi-
ent for a party having the affirmative of the issue to have de-
ziurred, even though not prohibited from so doing by the mere fact
that he had the affirmative of the issue.
There is very little in the earlier decisions to throw light upon
the subject. In Allen v. Bartlett,4 decided in 1882, the plea was
-non assumpsit. The plaintiff demurred to the defendant's evi-
*dence. Since the defendant voluntarily joined in the demurre',
-the court was not called upon to decide the propriety of the de-
-nurrer. Moreover, the defendant's evidence practically corrob-
orated the plaintiff's evidence and only a pure question of law
was submitted to the court. The latent attitude of the court may
very well be surmised from the opinion in Low v. Settle,0 de-
cided not long afterward. A plaintiff in ejectment demurred to
the defendant's evidence. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
The case was reversed on other grounds, but the Supreme Court
clearly indicates a doubt as to the propriety of the demurrer. In
an earlier case, Merchants & Mechanics' Bank of Wheeling v.
Evans,5 decided in 1876, is a plain intimation by way of dictum
that the court considered a demurrer to the evidence applicable
only to the evidence of the party having the burden of proof.
Basing conclusions upon these rather unsatisfactory decisions,
in the absence of more definite authority, it may be assumed that
-the rule announced in Mapel v. John is a departure from the pre-
' Bennett v. Perkins, svpra. This is the rule now adhered to in Virginia.
Bonos v. Ferries Co., 113 Va. 495, 75 S. E. 126 (1912); Wood v. Phillips, supra.
But since the demurrant must waive all his conflicting evidence, it is rare that one
having the affirmative of the issue or the burden of proof will find it expedient
-to demur. See note 28, supra.
" 20 W. Va.'46 (1882).
22 W. Va. 387 (1883).
9 W. Va. 373 (1876). In Hall v. Webb, 21 W. Va. 3181 (1883), a plaintiff in
ejectment demurred to the defendant's evidence, but it is possible to reconcile this
,rase with principle. See note 12, supra.
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vious attitude of the court. In this revolutionary decision the
court for the first time positively and definitely decided that a
party having the affirmative of the issue might demur to the evi-
dence and have his own contradicted evidence considered upon a
hearing of the demurrer. A few months later, a plaintiff in eject-
-ment demurred to the evidence without having his right to do so
questioned.52
As has already been noted, this new conception of a demurrer
to the evidence was not to be accepted without a struggle. With
reference to which party has a right to demur, the most emphatic
reaction will be found in Bennett v. Perkins,3 decided in 1900,
in which McWhorter, President, delivered the opinion. The plain-
tiff in this case had the affirmative of the issue and undertook to
demur to the defendant's evidence. In no uncertain terms, the
Supreme Court held that the defendant could not be compelled to
join in the demurrer. The court bases its opinion upon fundamen-
tal principles, disregarding mere questions of expediency. The
case of Map.el v. John is ignored, and it is interesting to note that
the authorities cited are chiefly from other jurisdictions. Plainly,
-either Bennett v. Perkins or Mapel v. John had to fall. We have
-already seen that, in respect to what evidence may be considered
upon the demurrer, the doctrine of Mapel v. John survived. It
likewise seemingly was to prevail in fixing the status of the par-
ties who may demur, although the result in this respect is uncer-
tain and was reached by devious pathways.
The first assault upon Bennett v. Perkins, coming less than
three months later, in Hollandsworth v. Stone,54 was delivered,
unintentionally it seems, by Judge Brannon. The plaintiff in the
latter case, who had the affirmative of the issue and the burden
of proof, was permitted to demur to the defendant's evidence, on
the assumption that he had made a prima fade case on his proofs
aed thus had shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Ap-
parently, the defendant's evidence conflicted with that of the
plaintiff, instead of purporting to admit and avoid it. It seems
that Judge Brannon mistook what is variously termed the "weight
of the evidence", the "burden of the evidence", the "burden of
the case" or the "burden to proceed" for the true burden of
r3 Arnold v. Bunnell, 42 W. Va. 473, 479, 26 S. E. 359 (1896).
as 47 W. Va. 425, 35 S. E. 8 (1900).
.15 47 W. Va. 772 35 S E. 864 (1900).
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proof as applied in the law of demurrers to the evidence25 He
seemed wholly oblivious of the fact that to permit a party having
,he affirmative of the issue to demur to the evidence merely be-
cause he has made a prima facie case will in most instances in-
volve a consideration of conflicting evidence. That he did not in-
tend to recede from the stand which he had taken in Gunn v. Ohia
River R. Co.,5 and which he later took in Shaver v. Edgell,7 is
evidenced by the fact that he cited Bennett v. Perkins to sustain
his views in Hollandsworth v. Stone. Although Mapel v. John,
in so far as it holds that conflicting evidence may be considered
upon a demurrer, is cxiticised in Shaver v. EdgeZU, it should be
noted that the plaintiff in the latter case had a right to demur,
because the defendant had the burden of proof based on affirma-
tive pleas. Finally, in Bowman v. Dewing & Sons18 the court
unequivocally abandoned the views announced in Bennett v. Per-
kins and held that a party having the affirmative of the issue-
in this case a plaintiff in ejeetment-may demur to the evidence,
upon the sole condition that he shall have made a prima facie
case. Of course, it mattered not to Judge Dent, who delivered
the opinion, that all the evidence of the demurree might-in this
case did-conflict with that of the demurrant; for any objection
in this behalf had been eliminated by the decision of Mapel v.
John. In Robinson v. Sheets,"9 decided some few years later,'a
plaintiff in ejectment again demurred to the evidence, and appar-
ently the court decided the demurrer upon conflicting evidence.
Consistently, the controversy should have been considered set-
tled by the decision of Bowman v. Dewing & Sons.60 So long as
the court was going to hold that conflicting evidence could be con-
sidered upon a hearing of the demurrer, it was not illogical to
hold that the party having the affirmative of the issue could demur,
after having made a prima facie case. The logic of demurrers to
the evidence had been killed in Mapel v. John, and expediency
had been substituted. Thereafter, the logic of the situation should
have dictated a complete surrender to expediency. Nevertheless,
in Stewart v. Lyons," in 1903, Judge Brannon, still clinging to
r Harris v. welch, 104 S. E. 277 (W. Va. 1920) ; 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 904-7
KITTLE, MODERN LAw or' AsSUmPSIT, §515.
58 42 W. Va. 676, 26 S. E. 546, (1896). See note 37, supra.
57 48 W. Va. 502, 87 S. E. 664 (1900). See note 38, supra.
58 50 W. Va. 445, 40 S. E. 576 (1901).
59 63 W. Va. 394, 61 S. E. 347 (1908). As to the status of Wilson v. Braden.
where a plaintiff in ejeetment demurs to the defendant's evidence, see note 12,
supra.
0 Note 58, 8upra.
61 Note 41, supra.
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his original views, says that "a party on whom rests the burden
can not demur", and cites the logical but now discredited case of
Shaver v. Edgell 2 as authority. Finally in Reiniger v. Piercy,
6 3
decided in 1915, seemingly the last case in which the question is
discussed, the court lays down the following rule:
"While the rule is that a demurrer to the evidence should
never come from the party on whom the burden of proof lies;
nevertheless when the plaintiff has fully sustained by proof
the issues on his part, he may of right demur to defendant's
evidence -offered in support of affirmative defences interposed
by him."
*What does the court mean by "burden of proof?" That it
means the true burden of proof based upon the affirmative of the
issue is indicated by the circumstances of the case and by the fact
that Bennett v. Perkins4 is cited to sustain the rule. On the other
hand, Bowman v. Dewing & Sons,6 5 is also cited, a fact indicating
that the court had in mind that supposed burden of proof rec-
ognized by Judge Brannon in Hollandsworth v. Stone which is
shifted by a prima facie case or by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Likely, if called upon to decide the question, the court
would have indicated the latter conception as the one intended.
It is believed that the present status of demurrers to the evi-
dence in West Virginia may best be considered by dividing all
possible cases into three general classes: (1) Cases where the
primary consideration is whether the evidence of the demurree
supports the affirmative of an issue or the burden of proof, and no
conflicting evidence is considered. (2) Cases where the demu-
rer, if entertained, would necessarily involve a consideration of
conflicting evidence so as to decide the case upon a preponderance
of the evidence, and the preponderance is not plain. (3) Cases
where the demurrer involves a consideration of conflicting evi-
dence, and the preponderance is decidedly in favor of one party.
The first class may be subdivided into those instances (a) where
there is no evidence in the case except that of the demurree; and
(b) where both the demurree and the demurrant have introduced
evidence, but the demurrant waives his contradicted evidence.
e Notes 38 and 57, supra.
77 W. Va. 62, 86 S. E. 926 (1915).
4 Note 53, supra.
e Note 58, supra.
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Cases falling within the first division of the first class would,
by the force of circumstances, be governed by the orthodox prin-
ciples stated in the preliminary discussion. Likewise, would cases
falling within the second division of the first class, with the com-
paratively minor.qualification that uncontradicted evidence of the
demurrant would be considered on the demurrer. In the second
class of cases, even by the terms of the rule announced in Mapel v.
John,ee a demurrer never could be interposed. In such a case, a
party could not demur without waiving his contradicted evidence,
in which event the case would fall within class one. In the third
class of cases, independently of any principles which have hereto-
fore been considered, the court would exercise its discretion so as
to prevent the party having the lighter weight of evidence from
demurring ;" but, according to the doctrine of Mapel v. John and
the cases in accord, the party having the great preponderance of
the evidence, in spite of the fact that it may conflict with that of
the demurree, and regardless of the fact that such party may have
the affirmative of the issue, should always be allowed to demur.
Any doubt that may be cast upon the latter assertion by the state-
ments in Reiniger v. Piercy"8 would seem to be inconsistent with
the theory of the new rule.
The result is that Mapel v. John, in the third class of cases men-
tioned above, has added an entirely new field to the local law of
demurrers to the evidence. The old field still exists and still is
govern~ed strictly by principles announced in the early cases."
Cases in the new field are entirely anomalous, and much con-
fusion will be avoided if no attempt is made to make them con-
form to the principles governing true demurrers to the evidence.
The rationale of the new rule is that the court, in order to fore-
stall useless procedure which may lead to an improper verdict
and a new trial, should entertain and sustain a demurrer to the
evidence upon a mere preponderance of conflicting evidence, pro-
vided that such preponderance is so great that a verdict contrary
thereto would be set aside. Clearly, this is a pure doctrine of ex-
pediency, and it takes but a glance to see that it is based upon a
Note 34, supra.See numerous cases cited in 4 ENcYC. DIG. VA. AND W. VA. REP. 531.
Note 63, supra.
es Following are same of the many cases where the old rule stilI is recog-
mized as applicable: Meeks v. Ohio River R. Co., 52 W. Va. 99, 105, 43 S. E.
118 (1902) ; Vance v. Ravenswood, etc. R. Co., 53 W. Va. 338, 44 S E. 461
(1903) ; Gregg v. City of Morgantown, 77 W. Va. 171, 87 S. E. 77 (1915). Also,
see cases eftp'- in net- 34, 9, 40, 42, and 43. stzra.
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new analogy, that of directing a verdict upon a great preponder-
ance of conflicting evidence. The fact is that this new and an-
omalous practice is nothing more nor less than a plain and arbi-
trary engrafting of the doctrine of directing verdicts upon the law
of demurrers to the evidence. In this connection, it is interesting
to note the development of the practice of directing verdicts upon
motion.
It has always been the practice in West Virginia, when the party
having the affirmative of the issue has rested his case, to enter-
tain a motion to exclude his evidence on the ground that he has
failed to make a prima facie case. If such motion be sustained,
the court thereupon, as a matter of course, directs a verdict in
favor of the other party. 0 But not until 1902, in White v.
Hoster Brewing Co.,", it seems, did the court, without excluding
any evidence, direct a verdict upon a plain preponderance of con-
flicting evidence. It may be a mere coincidence that this decision
was handed down in the midst of the controversy started by Mapel
v. John, but the significance is apparent. 2 .
Although the new practice in demurrers to the evidence may be
looked upon as a substitute for a motion to direct a verdict, it is
distinguished by one important and peculiar feature impressed
upon it by the law of demurrers to the evidence. Reversal of a
judgment upon a motion to direct a verdict ordinarily results in
a new trial ;73 but a proper joinder in a demurrer to the evidence
usually irrevocably withdraws the case from the jury and pre-
vents the possibility of a new trial except as to the quantum of the
damages.7 4  In this respect, the new phase of demurrers to the
To A close analogy had always been recognized between this Dractice and that of
demurring to the evidence. Dresser v. Transportation Co., 8 W. Va. 553 (1875);
James & Mitchell v. Adams, 16 W. Va. 245 (1880) ; Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., 25 W. Va. 570 (1885); Schwarzbach v. Ohio Valley Protective Union, 25
W. Va. 622 (1885) ; Franklin v. Geho. 30 W. Va. 27. 3 S. E. 168 (1887) ; Nuzum
v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 30 W. Va. 228, 4 S. E. 242 (1887).
51 W. Va. 259, 41 S. E. 180 (1902).
7 Doubtless, the analogy previously recognized as existing between a motion to
exclude the evidence and direct a verdict and a demurrer to the evidence tended
to cause a predisposition to recognize a similar analogy between a motion to direct
a verdict on a preponderance of the evidence and a demurrer to the evidence.
7 There is much conflict and. uncertainty in the decisions on this point; but
the rule now prevailing scems to be that a new trial will be granted unless the
court can affirmatively see that the defendant in *error could not make a better
case on a new trial. Ruffner Brothers v. Dutchess Insurance Co., 59 w. Va. 432, 53
S. E. 943 (1906), and cases cited: Soward v. American Car Co., 66 W. Va. 266,
66 S. R. 329 (1909); Weeks v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 68 W. Va. 284, 69
S. E. 805. In most, if not all, the cases, the court seems to have lost sight of
the objection, whether technical or substantial, that, in setting aside the verdict
and entering judgment above, the court is entering a Judgment which is not based
on any verdict in a case which has not been withdrawn from the jury by agreement
or by a demurrer to the evidence.
7' Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Rutherford, 2 Va. Dec. 707. 35 S. E. 719
(1900) ; Gregg v. City of Morgantown, supra; Chafin v. Norfolk & Western R. Co.,
;supra.
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evidence more radically interferes with functions of the jury than
does a motion to direct a verdict. 5 Perhaps this very fact adds to
its popularity. The new practice is entirely anomalous and can
not be reconciled with principle. Whether it is justified by con-
siderations of expediency is another question.
" In Akers v. Do Witt, 41 W. Va. 229, 23 S. E. 669 (1895). Dent, J., says:
"So It requires but one more stroke of the pen on the part of this Court, in con-
struing this legislative enactment, to render the right of trial by jury, as pre-
served by the Constitution, abortive, and to reduce the jury system, so far as civil
trials are concerned, to the condition of a mere useless excresence on judicial pro-
cedure; and in such tvent the sooner it is pared off by the legislative scalpel the
better it will be for the simplification, if not for the purification and betterment,
of civil trials. But who Is to act sponsor for the probity, impartiality, uprightness
of conduct, and freedom from undue influence of those who may be called upon to
exercise the extraordinary prerogatives of both Judge and Jury? They are but men
-mere men-and not, like Portia, always above suspicion ...........
Some more ruthless hand must rob the right of trial by jury of its last citadel of
defense, and reduce it to a condition of useless existence--a mere name, without
substance."
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